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appointing a guardian of the person and estate of a minor may 
be vacated at any time, if the record of the appointment dis-
closes affirmatively upon its face that the order was void 
for want of jurisdiction of the court to make it. (Estate of 
Eikerenkotter, supra, 126 Cal. 54.) It thus becomes apparent 
that the order which appellants sought to revoke was a nullity 
and should have been set aside. 
For these reasons I would reverse the order appealed from 
with directions to enter an order setting aside the order ap-
pointing respondent guardian of these petitioners and all 
subsequent orders based thereon . 
.Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied June 23, 
1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22493. In Bank. May 28, 1954.] 
HIROKO K.A W .AKIT.A H.AY.ASHI et al., .Appellants, v. 
W. H. I10RENZ et al., Respondents. 
[1] Dismissal-Failure to Prosecute--Discretion of Court.-"Dis-
cretion" within Code Civ. Proc., § 583, authorizing court in 
its discretion to dismiss action for want of prosecution, is 
discretion of trial court, and it will be disturbed only in cases 
of manifest abuse. 
[2] Judgments-Opening and Vacating-Time for Application for 
Relief.-A judgment or order which is void on its face, and 
which requires only an inspection of judgment roll or record 
to show its invalidity, may be set aside on motion at any time 
after its entry by court which rendered the judgment or made 
the order. 
[3] Dismissal-Failure to Prosecute-Excuse for Delay.-Where 
validity of orders in guardianship proceedings can be attacked 
at any time, proceedings instituted by wards' motions to 
vacate orders in guardianship matter provide no excuse for 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 20; 
Am.Jur., Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, §57. 
[2] Lapse of time as bar to action or proceeding for relief in 
respect of void judgment, note, 154 A.L.R. 818. See, also, Cal.Jur., 
Judgments, § 111; Am.Jur., Judgments, § 727 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Dismissal, §§ 38, 40; [2] Judgments, 
§ 189; [3, 8] Dismissal, § 45; [4] Prisons and Prisoners, § 19; 
[5-7] Prisons and Prisoners, § 20; [9] Dismissal, §59. 
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failure to bring to trial their action against guardian and 
others for conspiracy to defraud wards of realty and for 
order declaring guardian's deed void and directing grantee 
to convey property to wards. 
( 4] Prisons and Prisoners-Status of Prisoners.-The civil dis-
abilities attendant on a prisoner's conviction of treason and 
sentence to death must be determined by laws of United 
States under which he was convicted. 
[5] !d.-Civil Death.-Civil death statutes are penal and are 
strictly construed. 
[6] !d.-Civil Death.-Pen. Code, §§ 2599-2604, defining "civil 
death" of persons sentenced to death or life imprisonment, 
are not applicable to prisoner's conviction and sentence of 
death in a federal court, since it cannot be presumed that 
the Legislature intended such sections to apply to every con-
vict regardless of where he was convicted and imprisoned. 
[7] Id.-Civil Death.-Power given to Adult Authority to restore 
certain civil rights of persons declared civilly dead, and pro-
vision of Pen. Code, § 2601, stating that a "person sentenced 
to imprisonment in the State prison for life is thereafter 
deemed civilly dead," indicate that California's civil death 
statutes are intended to apply only to persons convicted in 
courts of this state and imprisoned in prisons of this state. 
[8] Dismissal-Failure to Prosecute-Excuse for Delay.-Absence 
of one plaintiff is no excuse for plaintiffs' failure to prose-
cute action where evidenee shows that such plaintiff was 
absent from state at time of alleged fraudulent conspiracy 
was formed and implemented, and that he therefore had no 
first-hand knowledge of facts on which plaintiffs' causes of 
action were based, no necessity for his presence at trial being 
shown. 
[9] Id.- Failure to Prosecute- Suspension of Statute- Partial 
Trial of Action.-Proceedings in probate court with regard 
to guardianship matters and federal case involving treason 
charge against one of wards do not constitute a partial trial 
of wards' action against guardian and others for conspiracy 
to defraud wards of realty, nor make it impossible to bring 
such action to trial, so as to suspend operation of Code Civ. 
Proc., § 583, authorizing court to dismiss action for want of 
prosecution, where issues inVIJlved in other proceedings either 
could have been determined, insofar as was necessary, in 
wards' action or were of no consequence in relation to such 
action, and where other proceedings were entirely separate 
actions in different courts and proceedings therein could not 
constitute a partial trial of wards' action. 
[5] See Cal.Jur., Prisons and Prisoners,§ 23; Am.Jur., Death,§ 2. 
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APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Im-
perial County dismissing an action. Elmer vV. Heald, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Morris Lavine for Appellant. 
Horton & Knox, Harry IN. Horton and R. h Knox, Jr., 
for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs appeal from an order of dis-
missal entered on defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.) 
Plaintiffs' complaint was filed on March 4, 1947. An 
amended complaint, filed on December 11, 1947, alleged that 
defendants had entered into a conspiracy to defraud plaintiffs 
of certain real property and that in pursuit of this conspiracy 
defendant IJorenz procured his appointment as guardian of 
the estates of plaintiffs Hiroko and Tomoya, and, as guardian, 
subsequently sold the property constituting the guardianship 
estate to defendant Rashid for much less than its market value. 
It was also alleged that defendants fraudulently procured 
the sale to defendant Rashid of certain property belonging to 
plaintiff Yasabura. (For a statement of the circumstances 
surrounding these events, see Guardianship of Kawakita, ante, 
p. 840 [271 P.2c1 13].) Plaintiffs' amended complaint 
ended with a prayer for compensatory and exemplary dam-
ages, or, alternatively, for damages and for an order declaring 
the guardian's deed null and void and directing defendant 
Rashid to convey the property to plaintiffs Hiroko and 
Tomoya. 
Defendants answered plaintiffs' amended complaint deny-
ing the alleged conspiracy to defraud, denying that each of 
the orders in the guardianship proceedings was void on its 
face as plaintiffs claimed, and asserting that plaintiff Tomoya 
had no standing in court either because he was a citizen of 
Japan (with which the United States was then still at war) 
or because he was civilly dead as a result of his conviction 
of treason and sentence to deafh. 
On February 18, 1952, plaintiff noticed a motion to set 
the cause for trial before March 4, 1952. Defendants filed 
a motion to dismiss the action for failure to prosecute on 
February 26. Both motions were heard on February 28, 
and, on the following day, an order was made granting the 
motion to dismiss. This appeal followed. 
1954] HAYASHI V. LORENZ 
[42 C.2d 348; 271 P.2d 18] 
851 
Section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, 
in ''The court may in its discretion dismiss any action 
for want of prosecution on motion of the defendant and after 
due uotit:c to the plaintiff, whenever plaintiff has failed for 
two years after action is filed to bring such action to trial 
. . . '' 'l'he diseretion is that of the trial court and it will 
be disturbed only in cases of manifest abuse. (Hillsdale 
Bnilders Supply Co. v. Eichle1·, 109 Cal.App.2d 117, 118 [240 
P.2d :343], and eases there cited.) Plaintiffs have not shown 
any sueh abuse of discretion. 
Plaintiffs eontend that beeause defendants, in their answer, 
raised certain issues as to the validity of the orders in the 
guardianship proceeding (Guardianship of Kawakita, ante, 
p. 840 [271 P.2d 13]) · and as to 'l'omoya's standing in 
court, they could not go to trial until there was a final de-
termination in the guardianship proceedings and in the case 
of Un·itecl States v. Kccwakita, 96 F.Supp. 824. (Subsequently 
affirmed on appeal, 343 U.S. 717 S.Ct. 950, 96 L.Ed. 1249], 
reh. den., 344 U.S. 850 [73 S.Ct. 5, 97 L.Ed. 660], motion to 
modify death sentence denied, 108 F.Supp. 627.) Both in 
their amended complaint and in their motion to vaeate the 
orders in the guardianship proceeding, plaintiffs took the 
position that eaeh of the orders therein was void on its face. 
In such a ease they eould be attaeked and their invalidity 
shown at any time. [2] ''It is well settled that a judgment 
or order whieh is void on its face, and whieh requires only 
au inspection of the judgment-roll or record to show its in-
validity, may be set aside on motion at any time after its 
entry, by the eourt whieh rendered the judgment or made 
the order. [Citations.]" (In re .Dahnke, 64 Cal.App. 555, 
560 [222 P. 381] ; see also Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 
573-574 [122 P.2d 564, 140 A.L.R. 1328]; Estate of Estrern, 
16 Cal.2d 563, 571 [107 P.2d 36]; Luckenbach v. Krempel, 
188 Cal. 175, 177 [204 P. 591]; People v. Davis, 143 Cal. 67:3, 
675-676 [77 P. 651]; Winrocl v. Wolters, 141 Cal. :399, 402-
403 [74 P. 1037]; Kreiss v. Hotaling, 96 Cal. 617, 622-623 [31 
P. 740]; People v. City of Barnes City, 105 Cal.App. 618, 
622-62:3 [288 P. 442].) [3] The proceedings instituted by 
Hiroko's and Tomoya's motions to vacate the orders in the 
guardianship matter therefore provide no exeuse for plain-
tiffs' failure to bring this action to trial. 
The issue raised as to Tomoya 's standing in eourt is like-
wise unavailing. His judgment of conviction was entered on 
October 5, 1948, less than two years after the present action 
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was commenced. It determined the issue of citizenship. 
[ 4] The civ1l disabilities attendant upon his conviction and 
sentence to death must be determined by the laws of the 
United States, under vvhich he was convicted. (Beck v. 
Downey, 191 F.2d 150, 153, judgment vacated on other 
grounds, 343 U.S. 912 [72 S.Ct. 646, 96 L.Ed. 1328], and 
reinstated, 198 F.2d 626; Panko v. Endicott Joknson Corp., 
24 F.Supp. 678, 682.) 'romoya was convicted and sentenced 
to death in the federal courts for a federal offense. There is 
no provision for civil death in the law of the United States, 
as there is in the law of California. [5] Civil death stat-
utes are penal, and are strictly construed. [6] Sections 
2599-2604 of the Penal Code define the ''civil death'' of per-
sons sentenced to death or life imprisonment, but these stat-
utes are not applicable to Tomoya's conviction and sentence 
to death. It cannot be presumed that the Legislature intended 
sections 2599-2604 of the Penal Code to apply to every con-
vict, regardless of where he was convicted and imprisoned. 
The statutes themselves rebut any such presumption. [7] The 
power given to the Adult Authority to restore certain civil 
rights of persons declared civilly dead, and the provision of 
section 2601 of the Penal Code which states that a "person 
sentenced to imprisonment in tke State Prison for life is 
thereafter deemed civilly dead," (italics added) indicate that 
California's civil death statutes are intended to apply only 
to persons convicted in the courts of this state and imprisoned 
in the prisons of this state. 
[8] Moreover, the record shows that Tomoya was absent 
from the state at the time the alleged fraudulent conspiracy 
was formed and implemented. He had therefore, no first-
hand knowledge of the facts on which plaintiffs' causes of 
action were based. Plaintiffs have thus made no showing that 
Tomoya 's presence was necessary at the trial, or that the trial 
could not have been had in his absence. 
[9] Plaintiffs also contend that the proceedings in the 
probate court and in the case of United States v. Kawakita, 
supra, constituted a partial trial of this action and thus sus-
pended the operation of section 583 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. This contention is without merit. The issues involved 
in those proceedings either could have been determined, in 
so far as was necessary, in the present action or were of no 
consequence in relation to this action. The cases cited by 
plaintiffs in support of their argument (City of Los Angeles 
May 1954] HAYASHI v. LORENZ 
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v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.2d 16 [98 P.2d 207] ; Mercantile 
Investment Co. v. Sttperior Court, 218 Cal. 770 [25 P.2d 12]) 
were cases in which some proceeding had been conducted in 
the same action in which the dismissal was sought. Guardian-
ship of Kawakita, supra, and United States v. Kawakita, 
supra, however, were entirely separate actions in different 
courts, and the proceedings therein could not constitute a 
partial trial of the present action. 
Plaintiffs' final contention, that the appeals in G1tard-
ianship of Kawakita, ante, p. 840 [271 P.2d 13], and 
United States v. Kawakita, supra, made it impossible to 
bring this action to trial and necessarily suspended the 
operation of section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure dur-
ing the time consumed on appeal, is predicated upon the 
validity of their contention that the proceedings in these cases 
constituted a partial trial of the present action, and therefore 
cannot be sustained. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
When the trial court based its dismissal of plaintiffs' 
action on the provisions of section 583 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, it was guilty of a gross abuse of discretion which 
should not in fairness and justice be upheld by this court. 
Section 583 provides, in part, that '' 'fhe court may in its 
discretion dismiss any action for want of prosecution on 
motion of the defendant and after due notice to the plaintiff, 
whenever plaintiff has failed for two years after action is 
filed to bring such action to trial.'' The wording of this sec-
tion makes clear that it was meant to apply only to those 
actions which a plaintiff could and should have prosecuted 
without delay. 
Where there is good reason for an extended delay, where 
a party is unable for good reason to proceed to trial or where 
it would be futile or impracticable to prosecute the action 
promptly, an exception to the dismissal provisions of section 
583 is recognized. ( Ohr,istin v. Superim· Court, 9 Cal.2d 526 
r71 P.2d 205, 112 A.I.J.R. 11531 ; Judson v. 81ipC1"'tOr Court, 
21 Cal.2d 11 [129 P.2d 361]; Bank of America v. Superior 
Court, 84 Cal..App.2d 34 [189 P.2d 799] .) It is equally well 
recognized in CaEforina that the time, during which for all 
practical purposes going to trial would be impossible due to 
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impracticability or otherwise, is to be excluded in determining 
whether an action has been brought to trial within the time 
limit provisions of section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
(Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.2d 61 
[168 P.2d 665]; Westphal v. Westphal, 61 Cal.App.2d 544 
[143 P.2d 405].) 
In the case at bar the defenses, which were set up by 
defendants in their answer to plaintiffs' complaint, made it 
highly impracticable, if not impossible, to proceed to trial 
until a final determination was had in two other proceedings. 
As one affirmative defense, defendants alleged that plaintiff 
Tomoya Kawakita could not maintain the action because he 
was an enemy alien and since the causes of action were joint, 
all plaintiffs were therefore barred. In another separate de-
fense defendants alleged that certain matters had already been 
conclusively determined in a prior probate proceeding. The 
final answers to both these defenses were, as I shall point 
out, dependent upon the final outcome of two other proceed-
ings. In view of this, it would have been futile for plaintiffs 
to have attempted to proceed with the trial until a final de-
termination was had in these other two matters. 
First, let us consider the effect of the defense that plain-
tiff Tomoya was an enemy alien. As a separate and affirmative 
defense defendants alleged ''That plaintiff Tomoya Kawakita 
was not at the commencement of this action, and is not now 
a citizen of the United States, but was and is an alien and a 
citizen of ,Japan; that at the commencement of this action the 
government of Japan was and still is at war with and is an 
enemy of the United States; that by reason of the foregoing 
and the further fact that the first cause of action of said 
Amended Complaint is joint and not severable, the cause of 
action is barred." (A similar defense was set out against the 
second cause of action.) Such a defense would no doubt have 
been effective if Tomoya were actually an alien and a citizen 
of Japan since at this time a state of war still existed between 
the United States and Japan. 
It is well established that the rights of enemy aliens to 
prosecute actions are, in most respects, suspended during 
time of war. In considering section 7 (b) of the Trading with 
the Enemy Act, which provides that ''. . . nothing in this 
act shall be deemed to authorize the prosecution of any suit or 
action at law or in equity in any court within the United 
States by an enemy or ally of enemy prior to the end of the 
May HAYASHI v. LORENZ 
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\Yar. . " the United States Supreme Court has stated that 
''This provision was inserted in the act in the of the 
principle recognized by Congress and by this court that war 
suspends the right of enemy plaintiffs to prosecute actions in 
o11r eonrts." Colonna, 314 U.S. 510 [62 S.Ct. 
37:1, 86 L.Ed. 379] ; sec, also, Taylor v. Albion Lbr. Co., 176 
Cal. 347 [168 P. 348, L.R.A. 1918B 185]; Borovitz v. Ameri-
can liard Rubbm· Co., 287 ]'. :368; H. P. Drewry, S.A.R.L. v. 
Onassis, 266 App.Div. 292 [42 N.Y.S.2d 74].) 
Looking to the facts of the case at bar we find that prior 
to the filing of defendants' answer, on November 8, 1949, 
plaintiff Tomoya had, on September 2, 1948, been convieted of 
treason and found to have been a eitizen of the United States. 
Au appeal was thereafter taken and one of the prineipal issues 
was whether or not 'l'omoya was an enemy alien or a citizen 
of the United States. Due to the appeals, a final determination 
of Tomoya 's citizenship was not had until J nne 2, 1952. At 
tl1q.t time the United States Supreme Court, in a close 
four to three decision, held that Tomoya was, and at all times 
had been. a citizen of this country. (I[awakita v. United 
States, 343 U.S. 717 [72 S.Ct. 950, 96 hEd. 1249].) It thus 
becomes apparent that the question as to Tomoya 's citizen-
ship, which defendants sought to raise in their answer, was 
in constant litigation in the federal eourts from a time prior 
to defendants' answer until June of 1952, yet the instant 
('ase was dismissed on February 29, 1952. It would have been 
highly impracticable and futile for plaintiff Tomoya to have 
attempted to litigate his alleged citizenship in the California 
eonrts when the question was then currently a highly eon-
tested issue in the federal eourts. 
The second defense which necessitated a delay in bringing 
the instant action to trial, ·was the allegation by defendants 
that plaintiffs had no eause of action for fraud or eonspiracy 
to defrand dtw to the findings of the prior probate order. 
Such a defense pointed out that the probate order of May 22. 
1942, provided that the property involved was not worth more 
than $6,000; that the property was sold for $6,000; and that 
Tomoya and Hiroko had no interest in the property since 
said property was eneumbered for more than $24,000. 'l'his 
order which defendants rely on was the order permitting and 
approving the sale of the real property of the guardianship. 
J n their effort to avoid this defense, based on the prior 
order, plaintiffs moved to have the probate court set aside 
856 HAYASHI v. LORENZ [42 C.2d 
and vacate the letters of guardianship and all subsequent 
orders. Such was the most reasonable and expedient method 
of settling the validity of the guardianship once and for all. 
As stated in In re Dahnke, 64 Cal.App. 555, 560 [222 P. 381], 
"It is well settled that a judgment or order which is void on 
its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judg-
ment-roll or record to show its invalidity, may be set aside on 
motion, at any time after its entry, by the court which ren-
dered the judgment or made the order. (People v. Greene, 
74 Cal. 400 [16 P. 197, 5 Am.St.Rep. 448] ; People v. Temple, 
103 Cal. [447] 453 [37 P. 414].)" 
In the instant case proper notice as required by statute 
(Prob. Code, § 1441) had not been given to the parents of 
the alleged minors involved. Such a defect was apparent from 
the face of the record of the guardianship proceedings and an 
appointment made without the required notice is a nullity. 
(In re Dahnke, supra, 64 Cal.App. 555; Guardianship of 
Kerns, 74 Cal.App.2d 862 [169 P.2d 975] ; Guardianship of 
Van Loan, 142 Cal. 423 [76 P. 37] .) It is well established 
that the notice required by Probate Court, section 1441, is a 
condition precedent to the valid exercise of the power to ap-
point a guardian and is jurisdictional. (In re Dahnke, supra, 
64 Cal.App. 555.) In view of this, the most effective and 
practical method of attacking such jurisdiction was by a 
motion in the probate court to revoke the letters of guardian-
ship which were not properly granted. 
It could be argued that the guardianship proceedings were 
subject to collateral attack in the instant proceeding and 
that it was unnecessary to institute the motion to revoke in 
the probate court; however, such an argument loses sight of 
the practicality and expediency of the procedure followed by 
plaintiffs. If plaintiffs had attempted a collateral attack of 
the probate order they would have encountered almost in-
surmountable difficulties. Such difficulties were adequately 
pointed out in Asher v. Yorba, 125 Cal. 513, 515 [58 P. 137] 
when this court stated that ''It must be borne in mind that 
this appellant is here making a collateral attack upon a judg-
ment decreeing a sale of the minor's land, and, consequently, 
all the rules of law hedging about the validity of such decrees 
are to be invoked against her. The order of sale in this case 
is presumed to have been a valid one. It behooves her to show 
to the contrary. The burden is upon her to show a void sale. 
The absence of evidence in this record showing the jurisdic-
tional facts may be taken as evidence against her. If the 
May 1954] HAYASHI v. LORENZ 
[ 42 C.2d 848; 271 P .2d 18] 
857 
posting of these notices was not performed according to the 
requirements of the statute, it was for her to show that fact. 
If the evidence does not show how it was done, and when it 
was done, it will be presumed that it was done in the proper 
manner and at the proper time. Of course, we are not even 
intimating that appellant would be allowed to go outside of 
the record of the proceedings and extrinsic evidence at-
tack the validity of the guardian's sale.'' Thus it is ap-
parent that a collateral attack on the probate proceedings 
would have been a very difficult if not an impossible task. 
On the other hand, as stated in In re Dahnke, supra, 64 
Cal.App. 555, 561, "A motion to vacate a judgment or an 
order is a direct and not a collateral attack; and on such 
motion, if it be made in time, any facts going to show the in-
validity of the judgment or order may be presented-facts 
dehors the record as well as facts appearing on the face of the 
judgment-roll or record. (Norton v. Atchison etc. R. R. Co., 
supra [97 Cal. 388 (30 P. 585, 32 P. 452, 33 Am.St.Rep. 198)]; 
Estate of Eikerenkotter, supra [126 Cal. 54 (58 P. 370)].)" 
The court in the Dahnke case also noted that a judgment or 
order which is void on its face, and which requires only an 
inspection of the judgment-roll or record to show its invalidity 
may be set aside at any time by the court which rendered the 
order. It therefore becomes apparent that, as a practical 
matter, the best and most effective method of attacking the 
guardianship was in the probate court as plaintiffs sought 
to do. Until the validity of the guardianship orders were 
finally determined it would have been practically futile, if not 
impossible, to have proceeded to trial in the instant action. 
(See Westphal v. Westphal, supra, 61 Cal.App.2d 544; Pacific 
Greyhound Lines v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.2d 61.) 
In view of the fact that it would have been impossible and 
futile, from a practical standpoint, to proceed to trial until 
the foregoing issues, pleaded by defendants in their defense, 
were finally determined, the case should be removed from the 
effect of Code of Civil Procedure, section 583. It is well estab-
lished that the time during which it is impractical or impos-
sible to bring a case to trial should be excluded in determining 
whether a case Jws been brought to trial within the time limit 
provisions of sect1:on :'583. (Chris tin v. Superior Court, gupra, 
9 Cal.2d 526; Westphal v. Westphal, supra, 61 Cal.App.2d 544; 
Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Super~·or Court, supra, 28 Cal.2d 
61.) When the trial court failed to recognize these well 
recognized exceptions to section 583 of the Code of Civil Pro-
858 PEOPLE v. BALDWIN [42 C.2d 
cedure, and dismissed plaintiffs' action, it committed a gross 
abuse of discretion which should not be sanctioned by this 
court. 
For these reasons I would reverse the judgment of dismissal. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied June 23, 
1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[ Crim. No. 5512. In Bank. May 28, 1954.) 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. LEONARD J. BAI.~DWIN, 
Appellant. 
[1] Witnesses-Determination of Credibility-Right to Disregard 
•restimony.-The peculiar circumstances that asserted person 
to whom defendant attributed the murder with which de-
fendant was charged encountered defendant by ehance shortly 
before and disappeared just after the killing, and absence of his 
name from records of San Quentin where defendant claimed to 
have met him, together with other facts tending to impeach 
defendant, justified jury in rejecting whole of defendant's 
testimony as to such person. 
[2] Homicide-Evidence.-A verdict of first degree murder com-
mitted in perpetration of robbery is sustained by evidence 
that defendant had motive to steal victim's vehicle, that by 
misrepresentation that he was a deputy sheriff he obtained a 
ride with victim, that armed with a revolver he forced victim 
to walk to a place concealed from highway, shot him repeatedly 
in the back and buried him, and that he then took vehicle to 
flee from scene of homicide. 
[3] Criminal Law-Evidence-Confessions.-Although reviewing 
court cannot ascertain, either from general verdict alone or 
from record as a whole, how jury answered factual question 
whether defendant's confessions were voluntary, requirements 
of due process do not contemplate ascertainment of precise 
mental processes of jury as to confession. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Homicide, §§ 106, 107; Am.Jur., Homicide, 
§ 455 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Witnesses, § 293; [2] Homicide, 
§145(5); [3, 4) Criminal Law, §480; [5] Criminal Law, §471; 
[6, 7] Criminal Law,§ 467(3); [8] Homicide,§§ 235, 237; [9] Wit-
nesses, § 125; [10] Criminal Law, § 1377; [11] Witnesses, § 184~ 
[12, 13] Criminal Law, § 624; [14] Criminal Law, § 1404(8). 
